Written by Jan Železný
The Middle East seems to be in flames again! The surprising large-scale offensive of Hamas into the inland of Israel caught many off-guard, including Israeli political and military leadership. However, the subsequent reaction of global leaders and great powers of the international system varied significantly, exposing blatantly their different approaches to the region as a whole and stark contrast in their national interests. The U.S. response arrived quickly, as President Joe Biden released a statement condemning terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians, recognizing the right of Tel Aviv for self-defense, and offering military and diplomatic help. Even the European Union (EU), normally hesitant in its reactions, manifested its support for Israel in the speeches of Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen, while some member states (like the Czech Republic) were very vocal in their expressions of loyalty towards the Jewish state. Nevertheless, China, the current No. 2 great power, remained silent for a substantial long period of time, sticking to a very low-level position. Those who expected it to step into the process vigorously, build on its success by negotiating the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and underline its high ambition of becoming a new key Middle East player, were disappointed. But what does this development tell us about China’s overall ability to play a more significant role as a global peacemaker? Is it a sign of its unpreparedness to deliver such an ambitious vision (mentioned in a series of its “global initiatives”) or is there a strategic reason for this lackluster stance?
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) remained silent and held the international community in expectation till the 8th of October when it released a short statement on its official website. Its centroid consisted of the expression of Beijing’s concern over the eruption of violence and its appeal to both sites of the conflict to restrain from any further escalation. The only substantial point mentioned was a call for the continuation of the peace talks between Israel and Palestinians resulting in an adoption of the two-state solution, which corresponds with a long-term position of China on this matter. No further details were elaborated, and any information about alleged Chinese nationals held as hostages was also missing. The next day the MOFA provided a full press conference that caught the attention of the public and raised high expectations. The clarification of China’s position was awaited, together with suggestions of possible solutions or at least of description of Beijing’s next active step or a vision of the future form of the regional order in Palestine. Simply saying, any tangible content that would bolster the “Middle Kingdom’s” ambition of a leading power in the “community of shared future of the mankind” (using Chinese own terminology). However, the conference did not meet high expectations! Spokeswoman Mao Ning only reiterated previous insistence on the end of violence and mentioned the imperative of protecting civilian lives and preventing any further escalation. She also stressed an inescapable need for the international community to reflect “legitimate concerns” of both sides in the process of finding sustainable solutions for the future. Any decisive action was missing, which raised questions (mainly in Western media) about China’s ability and preparedness to live up to its promises. Nevertheless, Beijing’s stance corresponds with many aspects of its strategic visions, its long-term policy towards the region, and its national interests based on imports of energy sources for its significantly dependent economy.
The truth is that China has historically had much closer relations with Palestine, as it had been supporting many opposition forces in the world, before it was given a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, replacing Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives. In fact, Beijing was one of the first important partners of Palestinians, the initial contacts were established right in 1964-1965 when the Palestine Liberation Organization was founded. Its leader Yasser Arafat was treated by Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai as a soulmate following the same cause of the resistance against predominant Western forces (which Israel was considered to be part of) – comparisons between the Jewish state and Taiwan were made as well. Even Arafat talked about China very heartily as Palestinians enjoyed significant diplomatic support from Beijing in the international arena. China for example publicly criticized Israel’s “occupation” of the Palestinian territories, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and Jewish settlements, which were described as illegal under the conditions of the international law. An official recognition of Palestinian statehood in 1988 then represented a significant milestone in bilateral relations and sent a strong signal to the international community. The last proof of the continuing support was this June’s visit of President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas (of Fatah) in Beijing, where he was welcomed by President Xi Jinping in the Great Hall of People with all the honors. During the meeting, both countries signed a “strategic partnership”, China reiterated its support for the two-state solution in exchange for Abbas’s recognition of its policies related to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and even Xinjiang with its Uighur Muslim population. However, not everything was rosy as the meeting also presented significant limits of the relations, mainly in the economic sphere, which is of growing importance for China, as it tries to offer a counter vision of global economic development through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative. The mutual trade exchange between these two partners is very low (158 million USD), consisting mainly of Palestinian imports of Chinese goods and technology. The volume of investment also reaches insignificant levels and the areas for cooperation are not very numerous. Chinese investors repeatedly express their concerns about transferring capital into the area, citing the low return on investment, small and impoverished population, security concerns, and unstable geopolitical situation. The only tangible material result of the meeting was represented by a declaration on the supply of solar panels and technology for power plants, which were important for the Palestinian struggling economy, but very minor from China’s point of view.
The economic aspect of any partnership is, nonetheless, essential for China as it struggles to catch its breath after a series of long Covid lockdowns, experiences persistent deflation, and undergoes a real estate crisis. This prioritization is, nonetheless, not a new part of its foreign policy, as Beijing included it into its practice very soon after the opening and modernization of the nation promoted by Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. In that context, Israel started to be a magnet for China’s attention, which resulted in the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1992. The mutual trade has been expanding ever since, reaching 23 billion USD last year, when Beijing put itself into the position of the 3rd most important trade partner of Tel Aviv. Israeli’s exports consisted mainly of integrated circuits, measuring machines, and pharmaceutical products, China exported less advanced electronics, iron, semiconductors, or computer equipment. When it comes to investment, Beijing focused on advanced Israeli technologies, the results of first-class R&D, and military equipment. Especially the last item became very sensitive as the Jewish state signaled its willingness to provide know-how and weapon designs to Beijing even after the U.S. and other Western states ceased cooperation with China, citing security concerns. To avoid punishment from its allies, Tel Aviv allegedly sold plans for supporting technologies and dual-use equipment consisting of advanced radars, navigation systems, and rocket technologies – however, even this approach should have been strongly criticized by Washington as it warned China could misuse the technology for strengthening of its already formidable military forces. The interest of Chinese companies in artificial intelligence and quantum computing then falls into the same category.
The current flareup, therefore, represents a significant dilemma for Beijing, when it has no other option than to balance long-term ideological affiliation with the current needs of its economy. However, the financial aspect, even though increasingly important, cannot beat the traditional geopolitics and ongoing global power struggle. Abraham Accords aside, the relations between Israel and the majority of Muslim countries in the region remain strained. Furthermore, its autocratic leaders cannot alienate its own population by siding with the Jewish state, in spite of the fact they have no interest in the escalation of the current military operations into a broader regional conflict. China is fully aware of these aspects and based on that considers Palestine more as a gateway to other Muslim actors of the Middle East than an important nod on its own. Therefore, its attitude transformed into something that was in Western media labeled as pro-Palestinian neutrality. As proof of this shift, the transcript of the conversation between Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi with his Saudi Arabian counterpart Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud was cited. During the phone call, Beijing’s top diplomat criticized the Israeli counter-offensive in Gaza as a military act going “beyond the self-defense” and reiterated that “China believes that the historical injustices against Palestine have lasted for more than half a century and cannot go on”. Those words were in line with Chinese diplomacy’s general position of condemning the losses of lives of Palestinian civilians. Beijing also voted against subsequent U.S. draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council supporting Tel Aviv and remained hesitant in naming Hamas a terrorist organization (unlike the U.S. and Western partners).
This attitude, no matter how confusing and disappointing, should not be explained by simplified notions of the immaturity of Chinese diplomats, who are said to be unable to understand the region. On the contrary! Beijing might have been surprised by the Hamas offensive, however, it did its math and understood, where its national interests lied and how to protect them. The Middle East is a key region for the “Middle Kingdom” as it not only represents a new pitch for its great power activities, but mainly an indispensable source of energy supplies including oil and gas. China, like many other East Asian countries (including Japan), is dependent on these imports (the No. 1 importer of oil in the world), while states like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Oman comprised 18.4 %, 11.1 %, and 9.45 % of imports in 2021 respectively. Any deterioration of the relations with the Gulf actors could endanger smooth deliveries. The same can be said about a further escalation of the hostilities into a broader conflict, which could lead to military engagement of Iran – a backer of Hamas and Hezbollah, and also China’s close ally – and subsequent closing of the Hormuz Strait, which is a key artery of global oil deliveries and one of the most important “choke points” on the map of the world. The web of intertwined interest then reaches an even higher level as the current situation draws the attention of Russia, Beijing’s “unlimited partner”. Moscow thus approaches the battle in Gaza as a certain distraction for the West and its support for the Ukrainian effort to retake the eastern territories. Putin is well aware of the fact that Washington will have to divide its resources in case the conflict continues. Furthermore, Russia builds on the Soviet and Czarist legacy of close relations with Arabian nations and understands local governments as its partners and military hardware customers. In this framework, it is no surprise that both Chinese and Russian envoys for the Middle East (Zhai Jun and Mikhail Bogdanov) met in Qatar and promised to coordinate their activities. As China approaches Russia as its key and natural companion in an effort to challenge Western (meaning American) hegemony, it has no interest in undermining its position.
To summarize, current development, to some extent, collides with Beijing’s ideas about building friendly and peaceful relations with all nations of the world based on mutual respect, as it is mentioned in its “global initiatives”. But that is not the whole story! Like it or not, Chinese leadership is capable of following a very pragmatic strategy based on its national interests and its long-term goals of strengthening its global stance. Based on this it would be unrealistic to expect Beijing to take any one-sided approach or assist actively to Western countries in acting in support of the Israeli position. Even though any further escalation would undermine Chinese credit and endanger its economic recovery, any decisive action could lead to a significant crisis of confidence among its Muslim partners. It is much more realistic to expect China to take a “wait-and-see approach”, stick to a low-profile position, and try to limit the escalation from behind.
Jan Železný is a Ph.D. student of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of West Bohemia in Pilsen (Czech Republic). He conducts research on the formation and change in the international order with special attention to the U.S.-China power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic and space, and the issues of global political economy. He also works as a foreign policy special advisor in the Chamber of Deputies (a lower house of the Czech Parliament). His political comments and articles can be found on the Info.cz magazine website.
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